The Adler-Karlsson (1968) , the most general of the geo-economics and the business of Segreto (2006) . The work diversifies and updates the bibliography and incorporates new primary sources, including business and official sources.
Introduction
Just as protecting the United States and its citizens from any harm by means consistent with the idiosyncrasy of the nation -values, laws and way of life-has been an inseparable goal of the country's history, exploring the eternal dilemma amongst national security and economic development has been a recurrent issue for academics 1 . Thus, scholars from different disciplines have devoted numerous contributions to one of the episodes -the Cold War-. On the contrary, economic and business historians have paid to it little attention as such 2 . This paper focuses primarily on one of the key pieces in the maintenance of national security -the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). It explores the bases of the imperial domination of the USA through the scrutiny of the mechanisms and effects of controlling the transfer of knowledge and high technology amongst Western and non-Western countries during the Cold War.
It fits into the quantitative approach of Adler-Karlsson (1968) in its pioneer aspect or other subsequent studies (Jones and Karreth, 2010) , as well as in the interdisciplinary approach of Segreto (2006) . From the study of Spanish cases, it validates the statements of some specialists (Buesa, 2000) on the control of international exchanges of dual-use technologies and weapons as a variant of protectionism and an instrument for maintaining economic supremacy and Western leadership technological 3 .
From the methodological point of view, the study aims to cover the different forms and levels of the transfer, ranging from commercial operations to less conventional forms of technology mobility. In terms of geographic scope and direction of the flows, it includes movements from a peripheral country in the western area to countries of the opposite bloc and from a multinational company of a western power to that peripheral country.
*The current version is assigned to the project HAR2015-64769-P. Advances of this research were presented at four international conferences (The 2017 ISESS, Bali, Indonesia, January 19-21, 2017 ENTRENOVA, Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 7-9, 2017; EBES Conference, January 10-12, 2018, Bangkok, Thailand and International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 40th International Academic Conference, June 25-28, 2018, Stockholm, Sweden) . I thank the organizers for the acceptance of the papers and the attendees for their comments. A preliminary version was published at Biblio3W, 1.230, March 15, 2018. 1 Two chronologically extreme references: Barnett (1960), pp. 36-49; Asghari (2017), pp. 905-924. 2 Higgs (1994), p. 283. 3 In the wake of Adler-Karlsson are Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno (ed.) (1988) ; in its geopolitical dimension this article is aligned with Bonin 2007, pp. 235-254.
Within a clear propensity for the multilateral organisms, they appear the CoCom -object of our study-and the ChinCom, a committee of China, of independent character, under the advisory group with much stricter controls than those placed on the Soviet bloc 9 . This coalition set up organisms of capture of technology and knowledge, in general linked directly to the authorities and, sometimes, on an exclusively national basis 10 . The CoCom (1949) was a contemporary of NATO and the Berlin airlift, with the mission of coordinating Western export policies towards the eastern bloc under the US aegis. Strictly speaking a 'non-treaty international community of nations', it was composed of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance except Ireland plus Japan and. Its functions consisted in drawing up checklists, granting permits or exceptions to export certain items of the embargoed list and exchanging information about them 11 . Frequent divergences often due to conflicting interests between members occurred indoor, and even confrontations that did not reach beyond, drowned in the opacity and ultrasecretism imposed on national delegations 12 . The angers touched the ignition punctually, as it happened when the US government made the export permits to the United Kingdom (UK) of advanced technology subject to the possibility of accessing the accounts and files of the companies involved 13 . At the beginning of the 1970s, the effectiveness of the system and its valuable contribution to the success of the deterrence strategy were unanimously recognized, without denying problems in maintaining the cooperation of the other members of the CoCom with the consequent threat to the effectiveness continuous of the system. In general, the US was in favor of maintaining more extensive controls than the CoCom partners, more inclined to reductions in the coverage of the blockade. The difficulties in the multilateral body were exacerbated by the prevailing spirit of detente, the new emphasis on East-West trade and the increasing pressures 14 .
Since the mid-1970s, the US was certain that, the strategic balance could suffer a tipping in favor of the USSR in just a decade if the massive soviet R & D programs underway achieved the advances they wanted. The USA knew that the relative technological backwardness in some advanced technological areas did not prevent Eastern Europe from supplanting the West as the main source of machine tools for the USSR. There were bags of knowledge where the Eastern European contribution was more significant. This group included electron beam furnaces and the advanced integrated circuits of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a country with its own network of technology diversion as noted before 15 . NYT, 6/1/1985; Le Monde, 25/8/1992. 13 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Documents, 1986 , p. 36. 14 Foreign Relations, 1969 -1976 , E-15, 30/1/1973 . Different visions of the USA and Europe: Ravenhill 2014, p. 61; US Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1980, p. 161. In the Kissinger era, the operation of the CoCom was considered "reasonably effective': Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1, December 21, 1968 . The Department of Defense attributed many of the difficulties to the profound differences between the main US departments and the agencies involved in Washington's decision-making mechanism. The blacklist of the CoCom reproduced in an abbreviated form the Defense, including, in addition to military technologies, computers, software, robots, silicon technology and materials: Pianta 1988. Critical assessment of the CoCom and its failure to counter the Soviet rise as a power nuclear and space : Naylor 1999, p. 37 15 Interagency Intelligence 1988, p. 1; McDaniel 1993, p. 104 ; in the GDR, the very advanced Carl Zeiss Jena stood out as a center of excellence.
In their efforts to close the technological gap with the Americans, the Soviets consciously sought to reduce both the closing time and the cost of direct acquisition of advanced Western products and production technology 16 . The same preference of the Soviets for the finest technology available in the western technological leaders reveals documents of the CIA. At the beginning of the 1980s, when in a decisive turn to the previous policy of laxity the Ronald Reagan government redoubled export controls in addition to increasing military capacity, it was forced to confirm the achievements of the high technology capture effort carried out by the Soviets 17 . To restrict ourselves to very representative products, in 1970 the USSR had no semiconductor industry, could not even manufacture an integrated circuit. The technological blockade imposed by the CoCom in the 1950s and 1960s had obstructed access to computers. To preserve credibility as a superpower, the only way to effect change was to appropriate North American technology directly throughout the 1970s or indirectly from the next years 18 .
In the assets of the self-proclaimed 'grand strategy', Reagan highlighted the substantial results of his government to curb the flow of strategic technologies to the USSR and its allies
19
. Others have not been so optimistic. The reinforcement of restrictions on exports was a response from the US at the beginning of sales of cutting-edge technology carried out by various countries. However, the effects decreased because of the decline of US leadership in these technologies. Lost total autonomy in control measures, some European countries sought to regroup in defense of common interests. Thus, at the end of the 1980s, France turned to Germany as a guideline of its policies critical of the CoCom rules 20 .Outside of Europe, over the years, the United States has not ceased its efforts to control shipments of sensitive technology to Cuba until the embargo becomes law 21 . In response to the changes in world geopolitics after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bush Administration was inclined to improve the exchange of advanced technology merchandise and avoid illegal trade in them. From the organizational point of view, in 1992 the CoCom Cooperation Forum was created to include the new states of the former USSR and other Eastern European countries 22 .
Firms under turmoil
That enormous fascination of the USSR and its allies for the most sophisticated Western technology fit in the great and growing interest of the US industry in the Soviet market, not always solved by legal channels 23 .
16 Foreign Relations 2014, p. 490 and 496; OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1985, p. 25; NATO 1984, p. 48; Ministerial Session, 9-10/12/1982. 17 The budget and resources allocated to prevent the illegal transfer of technology in the Department of Commerce tripled; similar increases were made in the Department of Defense as well as in the customs service: Freedenberg 1992, p. 6. 18 Stephen D. Bryen, 14/11/1987; Le Monde (LeM), 20/7/1978 . Gorbachev alluded in 1989 to the beginning of the demolition of the "internal COCOM", the wall that separated the military and civil goods: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 1990 , p. 197-205. Gorbachev's (1986 modernizing program emphasized the development of the most cutting-edge economic sectors, microelectronics in a particular way : Interagency Intelligence 1988; CIA, 7327347, NIE 11-7-87, August 1987; SNIE 3/11-4-81, 17/11/1981 The diversion of technology to the non-Western bloc is closely linked to sound cases that showed the US failure to contain Soviet efforts to trap the West. Not a few involved companies of great importance and others added new episodes that are indelible to global espionage, such as the Farewell affaire 27 . In the Toshiba case, for example, the US reacted with virulence by negotiating in Congress the ban on all imports of that Japanese company's products 28 . Some, such as that of the German company Imhausen-Chemie even acquired scandal tints (Rabtagate). Imhausen sold equipment and know-how (technical advisors) for the production of chemical weapons to Libya by means of an a well-planned operation camouflaged by the point of departure of the material (Hong Kong as well as other Asian ports) and a ghost company (Pen-Tsao-Materia-Medica-Center Ltd) to hide his real destiny 29 . In fact, Libya enjoyed a 'special relationship' with the Federal Republic of Germany for a long time since, in the 1970s, German MBB engineers created the group Otrag, an engineering company dedicated to the construction of a medium-range ballistic missile in that country 30 . Beyond specific cases, the systematic practice of the so-called techno banditry brought to light sophisticated multinational networks of suppliers, intermediaries, agents and interposed companies that camouflaged the technological products to send them to 24 TPLoUSD registers 5,691 entries for 'customs seizures, electronic equipment'. A double side in the attitude of the USA is showed in the cases of Switzerland and Sweden according to specialists: a use of economic pressure to influence the economic policies of neutral countries and a willingness to compromise in order to avoid undermining other policies of their own, particularly their desire to support non-communist countries and attract them to their orbit: Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy 2010, p. 51. 25 Gregory 1987, p. 867. 26 In 1967, the KGB sent 1,495 reports, 9,910 materials and 1,403 samples of foreign technology to the USSR, while obtaining 1,376 papers and greater than 330 more recent samples of foreign technology: KGB 1968. North American intelligence experts estimated that since the late 1970s, 30,000 pieces of high-tech equipment and 400,000 technical documents had been smuggled out of the US: Weyhrauch 1986, p. 206. The Soviets acquired more than 2,500 pieces of western microelectronics equipment between the early 1970s and 1980s: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 27 Crawford 2013, p. 133; Wrubel 1989, p. 241-273; The Economist, 27/6/1987, p. 66 and 11/7/1987, p. 72; Paradigms, 4, 1, June 1990, p. 74-99; New York Times, 9/10/1989; Rhoades 1989, p. 38 . For the Center for Security Policy, the Toshiba case clearly showed little or no control of the country concerned over export permits, inadequate research capacities and enforcement measures: Center for Security Policy, 21/3 / 1989. The Japanese authorities considered the scandal detrimental to the credibility of the country and the North Americans accused the coup: NYT, 3/14/1988. US officials linked Kongsberg/Toshiba's detour to the most famous -and controversial -case of Norwegian espionage (1984) in which Arne Treholt, a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 'young golden' of public life in Norway, was finally prosecuted for passing classified information to the KGB and sentenced to 20 years in prison: New York Times, 29/1/1984 and 9/7/1987. 28 Toshiba provided the USSR with machinery applicable to the production of more efficient submarines. Sanctions against Toshiba and partners were the subject of several bills at the 100th Congress (1987) (1988) , along with several amendments. Some highlighted the capricious attitude of the Pentagon to the maneuvers of Kongsberg, who built a sophisticated missile for the US and placed a tenth of its sales in the US Navy: neutral nations with final destination to the Warsaw Pact and, selectively, to the countries that had a certain role assigned by the CMEA 31 .
In reality, the North Americans wanted to control the companies and hunt man in order to cover all the channels of transfer in their various forms. In the lists sent by the Department of Defense to its diplomats were engineers and industrialists, who were being vetoed in commercial operations with companies based in the USA. But the real headache was the innumerable intermediary companies, along with the ghost houses, conceived for a limited number of operations and forgotten afterwards 32 .
Business tactics against the controls of technology transfer
Firms diversified their responses to the impositions of standards on exports of cutting-edge technology. In general, they bowed to the rules, even considering them excessive and knowing the numerous disadvantages, which ranged from considerable delays in obtaining permits to the outright loss of contracts to other competitors, going through asymmetries in the dissemination of information 33 . The peculiarities of the sector studied here, especially the exposure to an early obsolescence due to the high speed of technological change, accentuated the seriousness of the harmful effects caused by the delays. Manufacturing costs increased due to the obligation to maintain production lines outside the standard. In turn, the procedures for permits and conducting internal investigations in companies augmented operating costs. Given the drawbacks, on numerous occasions the companies decided to challenge the controls and export without being subject to the established standards 34 . According to a more specific reaction, in the US, companies, spurred by the government, tended to lower the technological level of exports to adapt them to CoCom standards and thus achieve export permits 35 .
In an opposite stance, some increased the sophistication of their shipments in an attempt to dodge controls over sensitive exports 36 . A different pattern was to exclude US technology subject to embargo and replace it with equivalent technology from other sources 37 . Some key US companies even went so far as to exert their control measures to exhibit their patriotism and not lose substantial contracts with the Administration. The controls also had other effects. Some companies gained a comparative advantage over competitors through the transfer of 31 The literature speaks of techno bandits (Melvern et al., 1984) or techno pirates (Discussion paper, 193-197, 1989, p. 60 . There were contrasts at a national level. In the UK, for instance, two different ways of controlling exports in the relations between the Government and companies were opened.
The Department of Industry and Commerce and the exporter often added forces to try to improve the chances of success of the permit application by trying to redefine the category of the CoCom lists. When a request for a license was stopped, the exporters usually reacted with a rejection of the controls because of the delays and the uncertainties that they entailed 39 .
In general, the firmness of the response of the companies was in line with the size of the business concerned. The sanctions against the companies involved in the construction of the gigantic Soviet gas pipeline, for example, revealed Reagan's contradictory policy, caused a real crack in NATO and was sharply criticized by large US companies, which saw the sale of equipment and equipment in jeopardy materials for more than 2 billion dollars 40 .
The requests for exceptions were wishes from companies of member countries to exempt CoCom control of an article whose sale was prohibited from being included in the embargo lists, whose evolution shows high figures in 1951-54 and a drop after. Each member government reviewed all these requests and recommended the decision to take -total or partial approval or refusal -to the CoCom, which, in turn, informed the requesting nation. Decisions had to be taken unanimously. In the US, exception requests from non-CoCom countries, as well as US exporters, were first sent to the Office of East-West Trade of the State Department. The processing of these requests was carried out through the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC). This implied an interinstitutional review that began in the Working Group I with consultation between representatives of the director level of the office of the State, Defense, Trade, Energy and Treasury departments, with the advice of the CIA. Exception requests grew significantly and almost constantly in the period 1967-1977. We refer, then, to a slow, complex and expensive machinery for companies 41 .
The economic costs: an approximation
The chosen interdisciplinary approach requires a brief macroeconomic exercise to evaluate the economic costs of control over exports. At that issue, a series of considerations are imposed, the first of which points out the difficulty of defining the scope of high technology
42
. The second one points to undervaluing due to at least four causes: lack of official data of sector and individual companies; data collected by specialized agencies not accounted for; hidden nature of the operations and difficulty of calculating the side effects on future trade, employment, subcontractors and government income 43 
Insert Figure1
Source: Own from Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, Washington, October 16, 1981. Third, controls must be understood in a very broad framework, with notable negative repercussions on the economy (Figure 3) . The evaluation of costs should not be limited to considering the effects on technology transfers and should be extended to the additional financial effort derived, essential to maintain the technological leadership against the enemy 44 .The economic impact of control can be placed on a broad approach to the European Union (EU)/US and Eastern Europe trade flows, on the one hand, and trade flows between the two European economic blocs, on the other, with a balance favorable to Eastern Europe (Figure 4) . The EU and the US were economic zones of equal importance with bilateral trade relations, generally balanced and sustained, albeit in an unequal context, fueled by the ambition of US military and political hegemony in Europe. The US, key in the economic organization resulting in the IIWW, worked directly in the European construction through a military instrument -NATO -and a policy aimed at imposing the alignment of Europeans in their foreign policy towards third countries. But the insufficiencies of the EU, an incoherent strategy, the fragility of its economic and commercial power, the incomplete state of the internal market and the foreign trade policy that trivialized the interests of the Union impeded adopting ways to rebalance transatlantic relations. The EU was not ready for the economic war imposed by the US through powerful intelligence and the redistribution of objectives pursued during the Cold War with the result of relentless competition 45 . 44 In the Toshiba case, the cost to the West of restoring the status quo ante was estimated at tens of billions of dollars: Center for Security Policy (1989) ; over time, the US Government ended up relativizing the effects: NYT, 14/3/1988.
Insert Figure2
Source: Own from Adler-Karlsson (1969), p. 46. The economic impact of the control was subject to valuations with irreconcilable positions in the Administration and the companies 46 . The sources, especially the press, refer usually in generic terms to the high volume of the transfer of advanced technology to the eastern bloc and speak of up to billions of dollars in value of just the hardware 47 . However, the official reports and the specialized agencies provide repeated information to determine the enormous magnitude of the traffic involved 48 Hufbauer et al. 1990, p. 33 . The monetary calculation of the effects of the restrictions and sanctions for the whole period is equally difficult to establish. We do have figures for specific years. The Academy of Science estimated the costs for the whole of the US economy in 1985 at 17.1 billion. A substantial part -some more than one third -corresponded to losses of opportunities in the exchanges within the West due to competitive disadvantages for the American companies because of the controls while 1.4 billion were lost in the West-East export sales. In any case, there were no unique explanatory factors for the decline in the global competitiveness of the United States, and export controls could only be significant in some cases. Richardson estimated that export controls cost the US economy about $ 29 billion in export sales in 1991 because of controls 51 . For its part, the Department of Commerce estimated that $ 2.2 billion of business was lost due to sanctions 52 .
The scope of control of the transfer of high technology: a business perspective
The massive transfer of advanced technology to the East reflected the involvement of a large number of companies, sometimes illegally. According to reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 300 companies from 30 countries were involved in movements to divert high-tech military products sensitive to the Soviet bloc 53 .
The thorough enumeration is difficult due to the secrecy of CoCom procedures as a primary instrument of the control system, the enormous diversification of technology transfer channels and the opacity of a multitude of illicit operations 54 . Conveniently used as a representative sample, it provides an approximate overview of the peculiarities of the companies involved in Western high-tech transfer to the Eastern bloc. To begin with the geographical origin, Americans predominated with 43.33%, followed by French with 23.33% and German with 11.66%. With much less presence were the Italians, Swiss and Japanese.
InsertFigure3
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In the paradigmatic affair Pégard, the government showed more interest than usual: Roodbeen 1992, p. 89. The Olivetti case, accused of being in dark dealings with the USSR and the KGB, was denied by the Italian Government and magnified by the USA: Il Giornale, 11/08/2005; Bertsch and Elliott-Gower 1992, p. 201 . Olivetti tried to counter exhibiting its export licenses and the antiquity of its exports to the East directly or indirectly through commercial offices and agents: La Repubblica, 10/13/1989; Washington Post, 10/12/1989. 56 Technip stands out, responsible for building with US technology two petrochemical complexes in the vicinity of the Urals and in Siberia for about 2.5 billion francs; an ethylene oxide plant in Bulgaria or, years later, a gas desulfurization plant in the Caspian Sea region: LeM, 24/12/1976 LeM, 24/12/ , 2/6/1975 LeM, 24/12/ and 18/12/1982 In terms of structure, the ICT and electronics sector predominated with 48.33% at a distance of twelve percentage points above the machinery, a sector in which Western Europe headed the group of suppliers to the East, at a huge distance from the USA. Thus, Europe supplied approximately 80% of the Soviet imports of machine tools of western origin and 60% corresponded to the FRG 57 . The group that included raw materials occupied residual positions. With a clear change in the head of the ranking-ICT and electronics instead of machinery-the structure bears a strong resemblance to that of US trade with the Soviet Union in 1960-1985, presented above ( Table 2) . As for the destination of the transfer, the USSR predominates, the hegemonic power of the bloc, just as the US does in the western bloc. Unfortunately, the lack of complete data does not allow to quantify the total volume of operations, although the partial figures allow to see a high amount. We take for granted the incomplete nature because numerous companies that export sensitive goods are documented, without there being absolute proof that their final destination was the eastern bloc. This category includes Philips Elmet Corp., Antex, Attleboro, Interdata Inc., division of Perkin Elmer and Oceanport 58 . The shortage of information about certain operations and the extension of some over several years prevent establishing an exact chronology but we can observe a clear concentration in [1982] [1983] . No doubt that the explanation lies in the relationship with the Exodus Operation of accentuation of the controls and with the construction project of the aforementioned Siberian gas pipeline, precisely one of the most outstanding episodes 59 . 57 Cambier 1985, p. 184. Computers, machine tools and telecommunications added more than three quarters of volume of permits : Meijer 2016, p. 132 . In some countries, as it was in the UK, the machine tool industry was experiencing serious difficulties: COCOM list review: IL 1091 -numerical control machine tools, 10/3/1975. The US recalled that its high-tech companies had a trade deficit for the first time in history; the trade balance of the US machine tool industry became in deficit in the second half of the 1970s: General Accounting Office 1990, p. 6. From the business history perspective, the US embargo placed hindrances in the way of European companies associated with the construction of the pipeline and evidenced Europe's technological dependence. Washington expected the lifting of the embargo against the double commitment of Europeans to reduce their dependence on energy in the East for better control of high-tech exports and to reduce credit with preferential rates granted to the CMEA countries 60 .
Spain and the transfer of advanced technology to the non-capitalist bloc
The rank of the largest non-CoCom importer, after Switzerland, of goods controlled by that specialized agency gave Spain a high probability of re-exporting that type of goods
61
. Within the relatively complex framework of reexports in their route variables and intermediaries, a branch of the world route of diverted technology was called the silicon route. The majority of the Spanish companies with North American technology that re-exported to the Eastern countries were based in Barcelona. The condition of privileged point of Europe, which combined a great business dynamism with insufficient industrial control for the large number of existing undertakings and companies, made the city preferred for the illicit traffic of technology. Sometimes, as in foreign cases, the silicon route had a Central European connection, preferably in Switzerland, a neutral territory in which operations payments were made with great frequency 62 .
The broad perspective of this article claims to take into account not only the physical contents of the technology transfer but also the knowledge. Special attention deserves the geopolitical involvement of technology transfer controls in neutral countries, as was the case in Spain. It is, in particular, the interference of the US Administration in the dynamics of creating a headquartered in Spain joint venture with AT & T in the field of microelectronics with USA technology. Precisely, the microelectronics, in unstoppable rise, was among the 'critical' areas whose re-exportation Reagan intended to obstruct precisely because it considered it a powerful instrument of development 63 . The US demanded adhesion to the CoCom or a bilateral agreement with the US to obtain sufficient guarantees that the transfer of dual-use technologies would not go to the enemy. It was an indispensable condition to give free rein to the investments of AT & T in Spain against the alternative of the UK, a country committed to an independent national industry of semiconductors 64 . Until Spain joined CoCom, the US did not unlock the creation of a joint venture with US majority capital that manufactured next-generation chips outside the US, named AT & T Microelectrónica de España 65 .
Possibly the best compendium of the work carried out by Spain within the CoCom lies in a response formulated by the government in the Congress of Deputies. The representative of the Executive identified it with that of any member, that is, participating in the various subcommittees established, particularly in the review of lists and authorization of exports of dual-use technologies. In that, he defended the rationality of the lists through the elimination of technologies that were already of generalized knowledge. In the second, he tried to obtain the authorizations requested by Spanish companies 66 . From the normative point of view, in 1988 the Subdirectorate General of Foreign Trade Control was created in Spain, coordinating body of the ministries involved (Economy and Treasury, Industry, Defense and Foreign Affairs). A new front opened up between exporting companies and the government, in which discrepancies were detected between the Ministry of Commerce, committed to the promotion of exports, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convinced of the need to adapt to the CoCom's dictates as means of giving Spain access to the high technology of the most advanced member countries. At the beginning of 1990 a control system came into force with the publication in the Official State Gazette of the list of products subject to special license and the creation of a registry of companies dedicated to this trade.
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Criticism from conservative positions (Cato Institute): Gavin III 1989, p. 1-12. 61 Roodbeen 1992, p. 86.
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El Periódico, 2/7/1986. Reference to those networks in the US : Federal Register, 47, 42, 3/3/1982 . 63 19/4/1988 Roodbeen 1992, p. 86; NYT, 5/12/1985. Some countries not integrated into the CoCom, including Ireland, followed the policy of the multilateral organization : Fitzpatrick 1988, p. 249. It remains to consider the economic impact of the controls on the transfer of advanced technology in Spain, a complicated task due essentially to the dearth of data for the 1980s 68 . Let us first point out that, in absolute terms, the economic effect could not be very large since Spanish exports of this category never exceeded 2% of total exports. Comparatively, the percentage was below the European figures 69 . We do know the figures of Spanish exports of dual-use goods of the following decade, which show a double successive movement of rise in the first half and a tendency to fall later. Difficult behavior could hardly be attributed to the same phenomenon of progressive disappearance of controls or revision of their mechanisms since the end of the Cold War. There is still a final assessment related to the approach and refers to the need to take into account non-purely quantitative elements regarding the volume of transfers. Unfortunately, the data is not abundant here either, on the contrary. If credit is given to the official calculations, there was a loss of competitiveness for at least a third of A long and patient work of gleaning in diverse sources has brought out a dozen companies related to the transfer of technology to the East (Table 3) Let's focus on a particular case and analyze to begin the Piher one, an emblematic company in the sector. Created in 1949 -contemporary, therefore of the CoCom -, in order to self-supply of components for radio devices, it quickly reached thirty workers. The increase in activity in its production and sales lines led it to move from temporary premises to a new plant. Piher faced a mixture of problems when it came to focusing his expansion. Although beneficiaries of government regulations required significant measures of local content in imported products, the quasi-monopoly regulator had confined the company to the domestic market. Overcoming such a limitation required an innovative approach, which was reflected in the in the production of goods protected by the state and the cheapness of the workforce. As a non-technological or commercially advanced country, Spain saw this comparative advantage threatened by the profound changes that were taking place in the international division of labor. Given this panorama, Piher endeavored to invest in research and development to achieve processes of industrial excellence capable of competing in the world market. Its exports increased by 70% during the first six months of 1973, from 262 to 465 million pesetas 74 .
The US authorities included Piher in the denial orders, a blacklist of companies banned from accessing advanced technology from the United States, and imposed a commercial blockade, temporarily denying export permits But the most interesting thing here is the contribution of this modest example to the full knowledge of the scope of the economic impact, an exercise that must take into account the situation that crosses a company or a specific industrial sector, as we have indicated above. Among the government projects, Piher entered as the backbone of a second less sophisticated technology factory with a company, backed by a research center. After successive plans with the public sector and with multinationals -the Japanese Hokuriku Denki, interested in becoming a member-, suspended payments, finally entered into conversion and was partially acquired by the Spanish Government. The remaining companies of the Piher group ran the fate of Piher Semiconductors S. A. Far from our purpose the temptation of a reductionist exercise attributed to the controls of the transfers of advanced technology in a peripheral country the final destination of a company. However, it does seem that they played a nontrivial role 77 . To finish, quite possibly the analysis of the impact of the controls requires certain finesse. In a new case, the application of the North American veto to the installation of air traffic control systems by Ceselsa, a private electronics company, which along with the public Inisel served as the basis for the creation of the current Indra, did not prevent the company's exports from growing but they could have mitigated the rate of growth of outlets to foreign markets.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the impact of controls on product movements and the transfer of intangible assets between opposing economic blocs in a short period of time during the Cold War period. To begin, it clarifies from the primary sources the assumptions on which the main contributions of the specialists in the matter are based. In turn, it does so from a position that demarcates ideology and facts: the evaluation of policies and their effects is far from the ideological trench opposed to state intervention in the economy.
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Cambio 16, 709-721, 1985 , p. 56. 74 De Velasco 2009 Guillén 2005; Tosses 2000 , p. 55-64. In 1972 , the value of Piher's semiconductor production was $ 165,000 : Electronic components, 1974, p. 143. 75 Federal Register, 47, 3/3/1984, p. 9.044 ; the denial order of export privileges of February 25, 1982 was modified by exception : Case No. 626, Federal Register, 49, 246, 20/12/1984, p. 49.490. 76 ElP, 13/5/1983; Technoproimport was the recipient of a shipment of accessories and automatic processing systems of Xynetics (total value: 270,798 dollars), export license issued to Intertrade Scientific, Xynetics distributor); in Hamburg, the outstanding agent Mueller commissioned and paid for the systems: PLoUSD, 17/9/1976. 77 Calvo 2016.
The copious empirical evidence provided has made it possible to advance in the general knowledge of an issue that is very much cultivated by the bibliography but with gaps in the business perspective and in the geographical scope due to the absence in the studies of countries that, despite their minor importance, result when least significant. The mechanisms, implications and effects on a western country of the North American system of control of the transfers of advanced technology and knowledge are shown. The empirical evidence displays to what extent the US subordinated to its imperial policy the functioning of the market economy, interfering in normal international relations with the subsequent threat to market freedom, conditioning entrepreneurial initiatives on geopolitical grounds, sometimes undermining the competitiveness of certain companies, among which were precisely some of the most dynamic in these sectors, and putting on the edge of the abyss the existence of them. Ultimately, the CoCom agglutinates episodes that appeared as separate and without any relation to be developed in different areas, that is, in the exports of technology the one and in the transfer of knowledge the other. In short, the Cold War introduced distorting mechanisms of the market economy altering the principles on which it is based and added additional obstacles to the traditional reluctance of the multinationals to cede technology. The study certifies with no less copious evidence the validity of Buesa's thesis on the control of international exchanges of weapons and dual-use technologies as a variant of protectionism and an instrument for maintaining economic supremacy and western technological leadership. At the same time, the study coincides with the central contribution of Segreto (2006) on the persistence of purely national interests under the umbrella of CoCom. Over Europe gravitated a deep asymmetry by the different magnitude that had the commercial flow with the East with respect to the USA. In this sense, Spanish companies charged with a differential of negative repercussions of the absurd mechanisms of the CoCom due to the great weight of the SMEs -more vulnerable-in the business structure. These were faced with a hostile institutional framework without having, for a time at least, the defense mechanisms available to member countries. Even ignoring many of its aspects, there was state intervention in defense of Spanish companies but presumably well below the intensity shown by counterpart governments. Some of the most significant cases could be used as a pretext to corner competitive companies in markets considered "natural" by the USA. It is logical to think that it could act as a deterrent in projects to go abroad of other companies.
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